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Law and the Possibilities of Peace 
Yxta Maya Murray* 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay introduces the Law, Peace, and Violence Symposium, which 
took place at Seattle University School of Law on March 14, 2014. In its 
first part, I describe the foundations of a Law and Peace school of thought, 
whose forefathers include philosopher and political leader Vaclav Havel, 
legal scholar Robert Cover, peace theorist Johan Galtung, Partners in Health 
co-founder Paul Farmer, and law professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow. 
These philosophers offer us three forms of counsel that aid a law and 
peace jurisprudence: they (1) help us fathom how law encourages violence; 
(2) aid our definitions of the very concepts of violence and peace; and (3) in 
some cases, offer hope that the law might promote peace, or at least anti-
violence. Havel proves to be one of the most compelling of these thinkers, 
particularly in his exhortation that we must live “within the truth,”1 and I 
will use his counsel as a frame for this essay. I argue that if we are to live in 
truth when it comes to matters concerning jurisprudence and peace, we 
must contend not only with Havel’s demands but also with Yale Law 
                                                                                                                              
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. Thanks to Mark Drumbl, Mary L. Dudziak, 
David Glazier, Priscilla Ocen, Roxana Florea, Bernard Hibbitts, Dean Spade, Kathy 
Abrams, Chandan Reddy, Amy Maguire, Uché Ewelukwa, Jane Stoever, Kathleen Kim, 
Gabriel Arkles, David Dana, John Kang, Nehal Patel, Deborah Weissman, Nadav 
Shoked, the editors of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice, and Seattle University Law 
School’s Dean Annette Clark. Special thanks to Sonia Katyal, Mary Dudziak, Angela 
Harris, and Paola Bacchetta. Please note that in this article, I refer to symposium 
participants by their first names after their first mention. I do this out of a sense of 
warmth for the panelists, and also as an experiment in upending law review conventions 
that create hierarchies. All complaints can be sent to yxta.murray@ll.edu. 
1 See text accompanying note 19, infra. 
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Professor Robert Cover’s: Cover urged us to acknowledge that law is an 
agent of violence. He maintained that law could never achieve peaceful 
aims. 
Johan Galtung and Paul Farmer add to the foundations of a jurisprudence 
of nonviolence by helping us define our terms. They observe different 
forms of violence and peace. Galtung describes cultural violence as social 
and legal constructs that make violence “look and feel right.”2 Galtung and 
Farmer also define “structural violence,” which exists when there are 
unequal distributions of disease, death, inequality, and blood violence 
through legal and social means.3 Galtung additionally identifies “negative 
peace,” being the absence of violence, and “positive peace,” which he 
accounted as “social justice.”4 Together with Cover and Havel, these writers 
and activists help us ask critical, first-principles questions about a law and 
peace project; namely, can law create positive or negative peace if it 
manufactures cultural violence that hides the structural violence it commits? 
While Cover clearly concluded no, I will recount how Menkel-Meadow 
gives us some hope for yes. 
                                                                                                                              
2 Johan Galtung, Cultural Violence, 27 J. OF PEACE RESEARCH 291, 291 (1990). 
3 My paraphrase of Galtung borrows from CYNTHIA COCKBURN, ANTIMILITARISM: 
POLITICAL AND GENDER DYNAMICS OF PEACE MOVEMENTS 242, 255 (2012). See also 
Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 1 PEACE STUDIES 21, 31 (1969) 
(“the general formula behind structural violence is inequality, above all in the distribution 
of power.”). Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois also include “humiliation” in 
the list of harms performed by structural violence. See NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES & 
PHILIPPE BOURGOIS, VIOLENCE IN WAR AND PEACE 1 (2004) (“Structural violence—the 
violence of poverty, hunger, social exclusion and humiliation—inevitably translates into 
intimate and domestic violence.”) In 1990, Galtung also wrote of structural violence’s 
effects on the “mind and spirit” as well as structural violence’s relationship to 
environmental destruction. See his Cultural Violence, supra note 2, at 294. For Paul 
Farmer, see PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE NEW WAR ON THE POOR 40 (2005) (describing conditions like 
“grinding poverty” as a form of structural violence.). 
4 Galtung, supra note 3, at 190. 
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In the second part of this essay, I describe the proceedings of the 
symposium. In Seattle, we learned from four different panels: “Law, Peace, 
and Property”; “War and Peace”; “Law, Peace, and Human Rights”; and 
“Peacemaking, Resistance, and the Law.” Our panelists included Mark 
Drumbl, Mary L. Dudziak, David Glazier, Priscilla Ocen, Bernard Hibbitts, 
Dean Spade, Kathy Abrams, Chandan Reddy, Amy Maguire, Uché 
Ewelukwa, Jane Stoever, Kathleen Kim, Gabriel Arkles, David Dana, 
Nadav Shoked, John Kang, Nehal Patel, and Deborah Weissman. These 
pioneers introduced us to many ways the law makes real Cover’s warning 
that jurisprudence proves to be an instrument of violence. The panelists also 
delivered critiques of the law and peace project.  
During the property panel, scholars explained how property law can 
foster human and environmental wreckage but also how property “outlaws” 
are pushing its boundaries to create a more inclusive and peaceable 
jurisprudence. In the “War and Peace” panel, we discovered how the law 
suborns war. In the human rights panel, we learned about the sometimes 
violent roots of human rights traditions, and the ways that human rights law 
can do harm while pretending to heal. In the resistance section, panelists 
questioned whether peace is a valid objective for legal reform, and whether 
nonviolent protest is the gold standard of resistance. Together, the panelists’ 
revelations and challenges raised crucial inquiries about our definitions of 
peace and violence, and about the prospects of a jurisprudence of 
nonviolence. 
In the third part of this essay, I harness the lessons learned from the 
symposium to articulate goals for the law and peace undertaking. First, I 
note that peace scholars and activists who care about law must develop a 
larger vocabulary for describing violence and peace. Legal scholars have 
more words for violence than we do for peace, and also understand brutality 
in more myriad ways than we do harmony. A larger lexicon for both 
conditions will aid a law and peace endeavor. Second, I note that our 
methods must attend to the local culture that is being addressed, and also 
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interrogate our aims, since history is rife with violence committed in the 
name of an abstract goal of peace. Third, I face up to Cover’s challenge and 
admit that the law is hostile to peace. Very often, law cannot achieve 
peaceful ends. I conclude that we must begin to think about post-legal 
methods of alleviating avoidable violence and nourishing social justice. I 
suggest imagining accompaniments, encores, accessories, and alternatives 
to legal thought that might create uplift. But I argue that we should do this 
in tandem with a jurisprudential effort to allay cultural and structural 
violence and to foment the possibilities of affirmative peace. 
I. THE POSSIBILITIES OF A JURISPRUDENCE OF PEACE, AND FOR 
LIVING “WITHIN THE TRUTH” 
When we ask whether the law can further the possibilities of peace, the 
first answer we hear is no. Law is violent, we are told by some. Law 
frightens the bad man into submission, others explain. Law is retributive. 
Law is racist. Law is classist. Law is sexist. You cannot legislate good will. 
We are powerless to make the law otherwise. 
Yet as the lawyer and poet Wallace Stevens once wrote, “[a]fter the final 
no there comes a yes, [a]nd on that yes the future world depends.”5 
And, as another poet counseled, beneath the ashes of our powerlessness 
smolders an auspicious strength. Within our obedience and haplessness 
clamors a stubborn imprudence that seeks the truth.6   
But what is the truth?  
 In 1978, ten years after the Prague Spring, and 11 years before he would 
become president of Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic in the 
nonviolent change of state called the Velvet Revolution, Vaclav Havel 
                                                                                                                              
5 Wallace Stevens, The Well Dressed Man With a Beard, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF 
WALLACE STEVENS 247 (2011). 
6 See discussion of Havel’s Power of the Powerless, infra note 7. 
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wrote the now-famous essay Power of the Powerless.7 Here, the poet and 
playwright described the costs of living in a totalitarian regime, which in his 
country’s case was the Soviet dictatorship. Havel argued that tyrannical rule 
entices the people into a voluptuous surrender. “Elaborat[e]” and 
“complet[e],” he wrote, the totalitarian or post-totalitarian nation proves to 
be almost a “secularized religion.”8 In its readiness to supply answers to the 
heart-clenching questions that face every person—what is right? what is 
wrong? what should I do?—the overreaching state offers an ideology so 
delirious that it anesthetizes its acolytes with its “hypnotic charm.”9 
Havel cautions us that indulging the temptation to follow orders, to do 
things as they have always been done, precipitates a deadly Fall. “The 
principle involved here is that the center of power is identical with the 
center of truth.”10 Can we resist such a catechism? Havel imagines that all 
people share some essential characteristics, that “[i]n everyone there is 
some willingness to merge with the anonymous crowd and to flow 
comfortably along with it down the river of pseudolife.”11 If we succumb to 
this lure, Havel cautions, we are lost. Except, there does remain some hope: 
he also allows for the possibility that within that same soul doomed to 
conformity vibrates another creature, a seeker who hungers for something 
real, even if it’s confusing or painful.12 
Which of these longings will direct our destinies? Havel, the able 
charismatic leader, assures us without irony that our need for honesty will 
always push its way forward: “In everyone there is some longing for 
                                                                                                                              
7 Vaclav Havel, Power of the Powerless, in POWER OF THE POWERLESS: CITIZENS 
AGAINST THE STATE IN EASTERN EUROPE 10 (John Keane ed., 1985). 
8 Id. at 11. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 12. 
11 Id. at 20. 
12 See text accompanying note 13, infra. 
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humanity’s rightful dignity, for moral integrity, for free expression of being 
and a sense of transcendence over the world of existence.”13  
Havel illustrates this contest between the interior serf and rebel with the 
story of an Everyman—a greengrocer. Havel’s greengrocer has his modest 
business, selling his onions and carrots, and one day the state orders him to 
post a slogan in his window that exhorts passersby, “Workers of the World, 
Unite!”14 “Enterprise headquarters” has delivered to him this little stigma, 
and he knows he must put it up or face the loss of his profession, and even 
hazard social and political banishment.15 So, he pastes it to his window. He 
doesn’t read it. No one else reads it. No one believes it. “He put up [all such 
signs] simply because it has been done that way for years, because everyone 
does it, and because that is the way it has to be.”16 
But one day the greengrocer blanches at this task. He tears the sign from 
his window because something “snaps.”17 After that, the dominos begin to 
tumble. He commences following his conscience. He speaks up when he 
sees injustice. He stops voting in elections he knows are rigged. He supports 
others who also refuse to float down the river of least resistance. He does 
this even while he understands that he will pay. And he’s right because the 
“bill is not long in coming.”18 Soon after his rebellion, his boss demotes 
him. The authorities deny him permission to go on holiday in Bulgaria. His 
superiors and associates begin to harass him. And yet the greengrocer 
invited such condemnation by renouncing the pseudolife, and living instead 
in the dolorous vibrancy that Havel calls “living within the truth.”19 
                                                                                                                              
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 13. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 21. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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“Living within the truth” is Power of the Powerless’s urgent takeaway. It 
energized the 1980s breakaway solidarity movement in Poland, pushing 
dissidents like Zbygniew Bujak to resist Soviet control.20 Chinese 
refuseniks harnessed its velocity in the 1990s.21 Feminists applied the 
provocation to the embarrassment of patriarchy.22 More recently, ecologists 
lean on Havel’s exhortation when wrestling with the causes of global 
warming.23 
The more one pushes at Havel’s urging that we live in truth, though, the 
less clear his mandate becomes. Havel defines his beguiling doctrine in the 
negative, showing how a failure to resist the unjust state prohibits truthful 
life. In his words: Living within a lie is living within a system that proves to 
be “permeated with hypocrisy and lies,”24 where the “working class is 
enslaved in the name of the working class, and the complete degradation of 
the individual is presented as his ultimate liberation.”25 False-life also exists 
                                                                                                                              
20 See Robert J. Gilbert, Transformation Political Leadership: Insight from the Example 
of Vaclav Havel, in TRANSFORMATIONAL POLITICS: THEORY, STUDY, AND PRACTICE 
206 (Stephen Brim Woolpert, Christa Daryl Slaton, & Edward W. Scherwin eds., 1998). 
Bujak is quoted as saying:  
This essay reached us . . . at a point when we felt we were at the end of the 
road. . . . Reading it gave us the theoretical underpinnings for our activity. It 
maintained our spirits; we did not give up. . . . When I look at the victories of 
Solidarity, and of Charter 77 [which criticized Czechoslovak law], I see in 
them an astonishing fulfillment of the prophecies and knowledge contained in 
Havel’s essay. 
Id. 
21 See GEREMIE BARME, IN THE RED: ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CULTURE 360 
(2013) (discussing Cui Jian, “the leading dissident rock ‘n’ roll star of Beijing,” titling his 
1998 album Power of the Powerless). 
22 CHARLOTTE KRAUSE PROZAN, FEMINIST PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 66 
(Leslie Block ed., 1992) (“Havel helps us to see how essential conformity is to a social 
system and the ideology by which it is maintained.”). 
23 JOHN BARRY, THE POLITICS OF ACTUALLY EXISTING UNSUSTAINABILITY: HUMAN 
FLOURISHING IN A CLIMATE-CHANGED, CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD 285 (2012) 
(“Though clearly written with the then communist regime in mind, Havel’s call to ‘live in 
truth’ is equally pertinent to consumer capitalism.”). 
24 Havel, supra note 7, at 15. 
25 Id. 
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where the “use of power to manipulate is called the public control of power, 
and the arbitrary abuse of power is called observing the legal code.”26 Such 
a system “pretends to respect human rights. It pretends to persecute no one. 
It pretends to fear nothing. It pretends to pretend nothing.”27 
Readers may respond that Havel’s apocalyptic vision has no application 
to the law of the United States. After all, participants in the March 14, 2014, 
symposium on Law, Peace, and Violence do not live in Soviet-controlled 
Czechoslovakia. We need not put up any posters. We supposedly do not 
buckle beneath learned helplessness. We do not believe ourselves enthralled 
with state propaganda’s hypnotic charm. Instead, we live in vivid 
democracies, where we cherish hard-won freedoms.28 We enjoy the right to 
speak, to teach, to write. Or—do we? Many Westerners congratulate 
themselves on their licenses to vote, to travel, and to be free of most forms 
of racial and gendered discrimination. In the United States, we witness an 
expansion of the right to marry and to adopt. Women still retain some rights 
over their bodies. But in the wake of US spying allegations, new abortion 
limitations, and deportation scandals, even these guardians can seem 
spectral at best. And if due process, free speech, and Eighth Amendment 
protections do exist in this part of North America, these latitudes are 
certainly not universal. 
Moreover, this procession of formal rights is not the whole story of “the 
law.” I invited each panelist to deliver a paper at the March gathering 
because she or he had detected how the law does bewitch us with elaborate 
                                                                                                                              
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 But see Dean Spade, Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law, Remarks 
at the Law, Peace, and Violence Symposium (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.law.seattleu. 
edu/multimedia-library/seattle-journal-for-social-justice/sjsj-public?destinationID=EcBM 
TObDV0SXshOhIQtrng&contentID=W-nRLwVxo0uolKAu3zL-9A&orderBy=videoDat 
eProduced&orderByDirection=desc&pageIndex=1&pageSize=10 (commenting during 
the Resistance panel, when he replied to one of my questions, “I do not believe that we 
live in a democracy”). 
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and complete assurances that things are as they should and have to be. The 
panelists at this symposium do not merge with the anonymous crowd, but 
instead recognize how our concordant self-governance is granted through a 
covenant of legal rules, regulations, and prohibitions that may indeed 
amount to Havel’s totalizing ideology, the state’s “secularized religion.”29 
This dazzling indulgence threatens to distract us from a key revelation: the 
law perpetuates violence upon the people. 
At our symposium we wondered at this prospect that the law induces 
violence. When defining the scope of jurisprudential brutality, we first 
summoned images of waterboarding and drones and refreshable kill lists, 
and history’s long ledger of law-supported war. Yet we also recognized that 
legal violence does not remain contained in offshore coordinates such as 
Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. It also perplexes domestic 
life. Our discovery was not without precedent: in 1986 Yale Law Professor 
Robert Cover published an essay called Violence and the Word,30 a work as 
nerve-wracking as that of other legal provocateurs like Malcolm X, 
Catharine MacKinnon, and Oliver Wendell Holmes. The law is brute force, 
Cover argued, whether here or there: “Legal interpretation takes place in a 
field of pain and death,” he wrote. “Neither legal interpretation nor the 
violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one another.”31 
According to Cover, the law is violent because of its chronic human 
breakage: every minute it wrests people from their freedom, their property, 
their families, and their lives.32 To consult the work of our panelists, we see 
that nothing has changed since Cover published his mid-1980s railings. 
Dean Spade and Gabriel Arkles have written of the violence of mass 
                                                                                                                              
29 See Havel, supra note 7, at 11. 
30 See generally Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE. L.J. 1061 (1986). 
31 Id. at 1061. 
32 Id. (“A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his 
freedom, his property, his children, even his life.”). 
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incarceration,33 and Priscilla Ocen has taught us of the raced violence that 
occurs in prisons.34 David Dana has described the pain suffered by those 
ousted by eminent domain.35 Deborah Weissman has written of family 
disbanding and eruptions of domestic violence in the era of financial 
downturn, and of the criminal justice system’s role in these problems.36 
Mary Dudziak and David Glazier have written of the United States’ 
unfading state of war.37 
We may discover even more violence than that. Not only does the law 
impose violence through commission, say, in its blight condemnations, 
crusades, and hatchings of prison systems, but it also performs violence 
through omission. For example, I live in a place called Studio City, 
California, a modest-to-sumptuous enclave that nuzzles Hollywood studios 
such as NBC and CBS. In my weekly walkabouts to Trader Joe’s or 
                                                                                                                              
33 See, e.g., Dean Spade, The Only Way to End Racialized Gender Violence in Prisons is 
to End Prisons: A Response to Russell Robinson’s “Masculinity as Prison,” 3 CAL. L. 
REV. CIRCUIT 184, 193 (2012) (“Because of the nature of our criminal systems and 
prisons, there is not a fair or safe way for queer, trans, and gender non-conforming 
people, or anyone, to be imprisoned.”); Gabriel Arkles, Marriage and Mass 
Incarceration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW & SOC. CHANGE 13, 13 (2013) (“Conditions of 
confinement for all prisoners are violent and at times deadly.”). 
34 See generally Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration and the 
Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1239 (2012). 
35 David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After Kelo, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 5, 19 (2006). 
36 See generally Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political—And Economic: 
Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387 (2007). 
37 See generally MARY DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2012). As David Glazier explained:  
Despite recent bipartisan support and several years of effort to improve their 
legal foundations, the reality is that the current military commissions remain 
badly flawed. It appears that a primary, albeit typically unstated, reason 
underlying their continued use is an effort to secure convictions that might be 
unobtainable in courts meeting accepted U.S. domestic and international legal 
standards, including the use of evidence gained through coercion or even 
torture. 
David Glazier, Still a Bad Idea: Military Commissions Under the Obama Administration 
7 (Loyola-LA Legal Studies, Paper No. 2010-32, 2010). 
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Ralph’s, I spy well-upholstered TV directors gazing warily at the world 
from beneath their trucker caps, as well as legions of shining, supernatural 
women darting in and out of boutiques. Cars glisten past. Luxury cross-
body bags bang against Pilates-hewn thighs. Nannies push infants about in 
thousand-dollar strollers. 
Yet, we have a homelessness problem.38 “We.” Lowering my gaze from 
the marauding directors and actress-wives, I see other people. The members 
of this second, shadow community wear unwashed rags and squat in the 
doorways of Banana Republic and Barnes & Noble with their hands 
outstretched. They lay down on bus benches. They lay down on the 
sidewalks. The hard lines of their faces reveal the rigors of their lives, and 
their shredded voices also express a hardship so malign that it must amount 
to a kind of violence. 
And still, the shining women walk by. The auteurs walk by. I walk by. 
The law does nothing about this. In my criminal law class at Loyola Law 
School, I teach my students that most jurisdictions forgo passing Good 
Samaritan laws, which would require us to help those in need.39 In the 
newspaper, I read that Los Angeles is in financial bedlam, and that our 
poverty problem is only escalating.40 But no laws bring deliverance. 
                                                                                                                              
38 Studio City homelessness is omnipresent and any resident can describe it to you. It 
doesn’t seem to be much of a news item, however. The last report I can find on Studio 
City homelessness comes from a 1990s article in the Los Angeles Times. See Carol 
Watson, Booklets Point Way for Studio City Homeless, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-02-19/local/me-222_1_studio-city. See also Rebranding 
Republicans in California, ECONOMIST, Sep. 13, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/ 
united-states/21616962-neel-kashkari-will-not-unseat-californias-democratic-governor-
he-may-help-his-party (“California’s poverty rate [is] the worst in America if you 
account for the cost of living.”).  
39 See, e.g., Susan Hoffman, Statutes Establishing a Duty To Report Crimes or Render 
Assistance to Strangers: Making Apathy Criminal, 72 KY. L.J. 827, 829 (1984) (“The 
undisputed general rule under both the criminal law and tort law is that there is absolutely 
no duty to rescue a stranger.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
40 Adam Nagourney, Report Finds Los Angeles at Risk of Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/report-finds-a-los-angeles-in-decline.html? 
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Moreover, in a recent State of the Union address, President Barack Obama 
touched on the minimum wage,41 but that will not do enough to address the 
manifold causes of poverty and homelessness.42 
So what good is the law if it will not relieve the worst suffering? The 
answer may be not much, or at least less than we supposed. This truth 
beckons. It stings. And so molested, we wake up. We begin to wonder if 
human degradation and want that go unrepaired by law could qualify as a 
kind of violence. 
When studying this key question, I have found that Havel’s 
encouragement to pursue the truth and Cover’s conception of law’s broad 
brutalities join productively with the work of renowned peace theorists and 
activists Johan Galtung and Paul Farmer. Galtung, a white-haired, 
bespectacled philosopher whose bemused air and reliance on flow charts 
                                                                                                                              
hpw&rref=us; LOS ANGELES 2020 COMMISSION, A TIME FOR ACTION 2, (2014), 
available at http://www.la2020reports.org/reports/A-Time-For-Action.pdf (“Far too 
many Angelenos live in poverty, both those unemployed and those earning low wages.”); 
see also id. (explaining that the Commission would not address homelessness as it proved 
“beyond the scope of what [it] [was] asked to address.”). 
41 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address (“In 
the coming weeks, I will issue an Executive Order requiring federal contractors to pay 
their federally-funded employees a fair wage of at least $10.10 an hour—because if you 
cook our troops’ meals or wash their dishes, you shouldn’t have to live in poverty.”); 
Reid J. Epstein, President Obama Signs Minimum Wage Executive Order, POLITICO, 
Feb. 12, 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/miniumum-wage-executive-order-
barack-obama-103450.html. 
42 See, e.g., NAT’L COAL. ON HOMELESSNESS, EMPLOYMENT AND HOMELESSNESS, NCH 
FACT SHEET #4, (2007), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/ 
Employment.pdf (“[C]limbing out of homelessness is virtually impossible for those 
without a job.”); Susan R. Jones, Representing the Poor and Homeless: Innovations in 
Advocacy Tackling Homelessness Through Economic Self-Sufficiency, 19 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUBLIC L. REV. 385, 385 (2000) (“Homelessness is caused by the shortage of affordable 
housing, poverty, low wage work insufficient to pay for basic living expenses, and the 
lack of services to help people overcome personal challenges such as mental and physical 
health problems and alcohol and substance abuse.”). 
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belies his status as a revolutionary, was born in Oslo, Norway, in 1930.43 
His authorship of works such as Peace by Peaceful Means (1996) and 
Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (1998) broke first ground in the 
field of peace studies. Dr. Paul Farmer serves as the Kolokotrones 
University Professor of Global Health and Social Medicine at Harvard 
Medical School,44 and his efforts to stop the international ravages of curable 
diseases such as tuberculosis have earned him a prickly hagiography by 
Tracy Kidder45 and other accolades, such as a 1993 MacArthur “genius” 
grant.46 Both men offer additional tools to help us comprehend law’s 
permission of human want as a form of violence. Specifically, Galtung and 
Farmer have conceptualized two key forms of violence, being cultural and 
structural violence. 
Cultural violence, writes Galtung, issues from elements of culture, such 
as the law, that make violence “look, even feel right.”47 In other words, 
there are parts of culture and law that allow us to dismiss violent human 
indignities as just the way things are. Structural violence consists precisely 
of how those “things are”: that is, the portioning of disease, death, suffering, 
and blood violence through governmental or social means. Galtung tallies 
structural violence as “inequality, above all in the distribution of power,”48 
and Farmer understands it as “historically given (and often economically 
                                                                                                                              
43 See Johan Galtung, Biography, TRANSCEND.ORG, https://www.transcend.org/galtung/ 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
44 See Paul E. Farmer, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, DEP’T OF GLOBAL HEALTH & 
SOCIAL MEDICINE, http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/people/faculty/paul-e-farmer (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
45 See generally TRACY KIDDER, MOUNTAINS BEYOND MOUNTAINS: THE QUEST OF DR. 
PAUL FARMER, A MAN WHO WOULD CURE THE WORLD (2009). 
46 See MacArthur Fellows Program, Paul E. Farmer, Medical Anthropologist and 
Physician, MACARTHUR FOUNDATION (Jul. 1, 1993), http://www.macfound.org/fellows/ 
157/. 
47 Galtung, supra note 2, at 291. 
48 Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. OF PEACE RES. 167, 175 
(1969). 
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driven) processes and forces [that] conspire to constrain individual 
agency.”49 
These concepts might elevate the law in ways that build upon previous 
revolutionary work: scholars and activists decades back made a home for 
naming inequality and suffering in legal discourse. Practitioners of critical 
race theory, feminist legal theory, queer legal theory, disability law, poverty 
law, vulnerability theory, and restorative and therapeutic justice all seek to 
repair the discrimination, ignorance, and social insensibility to human pain 
that Galtung and Farmer lament.50 By working against discrimination, legal 
                                                                                                                              
49 PAUL FARMER, INFECTIONS AND INEQUALITIES: THE MODERN PLAGUES 79 (2001) 
(describing how women in Sub-Saharan Africa, India, Thailand, and other parts of Asia 
“have been rendered vulnerable to AIDS through social processes.”). 
50 I have written of this project as it concerns critical race theory, feminist theory, queer 
legal theory, and therapeutic justice. See generally Yxta Maya Murray, A Jurisprudence 
of Nonviolence, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 65 (2009). For the anti-violence commitments of 
poverty law, see, e.g., the work of Denise G. Reaume:  
Social assistance recognizes that those unable to find adequate employment 
nevertheless need a roof over their heads and food on the table. The alternative 
is life on the streets having to beg or pilfer, exclusion from most social 
activities, subjection to the constant risk of violence and disease, the waste of 
one’s talents, and the likelihood of premature death. 
Denise G. Reaume, Dignity, Equality, and Second Generation Rights, in POVERTY: 
RIGHTS, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP, AND LEGAL ACTIVISM 292 (Susan B. Boyd, Gwen 
Brodsky, & Shelagh Day eds., 2011). For the anti-violence commitments of disability 
lawyers, see, e.g., Rodrigo Jimenez, The Right to Live a Life Free of Violence for People 
With Disabilities: International Human Rights Law and Non-Violence Against People 
With Disabilities, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY LAW 
405 (Marcia H. Rioux, Lee Ann Basser, & Melinda Jones eds., 2011) (“Criminal and 
discriminatory practices that constitute violence on grounds of disability not only cause 
harm, suffering or death for each person that experiences them, but also have an 
unestimated social cost as they deprive society of the full participation of this population 
group in all the areas of development.”). Martha Albertson Fineman’s work on 
vulnerability and violence includes The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 
EMORY L.J. 251, 270 (2010) (describing social institutions that “provide us with 
resources in the forms of advantages of coping mechanisms that cushion us when we are 
facing misfortune, disaster, and violence. Cumulatively these assets provide individuals 
with resilience in the face of our shared vulnerability.”). For resources on restorative 
justice, see infra note 92. 
Law and the Possibilities of Peace 265 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 2 • 2014 
theorists have for many years essayed to repair maldistributions of social 
power, an effort that identifies them as champions of nonviolence in 
Galtung’s terms.  
A Law and Peace movement seeks to build upon this foundation by 
offering its explicitly peace-focused and idiomatic inquiries to see whether 
peace theory and activism could help legal strivings against avoidable 
violence and toward the pacific. It makes nonviolence one of law’s express 
goals, and grafts Galtung’s and Farmer’s discoveries of cultural and 
structural violence onto jurisprudence. In so doing, we hope to rise to the 
challenge set out by Robert Cover in 1986: can law make a home for peace 
even though its landscape is littered with pain and death? May we gain hope 
from the likes of scholar Carrie Menkel-Meadow, an early visionary of 
Wallace Stevens’s “yes”?   
Like Stevens, Menkel-Meadow answers what seems to be an impossible 
challenge with an affirmation. She believes that law can be harnessed for 
nonviolent and fruitful means and encourages us to see beyond its 
repressive character that so chagrined Cover. As she writes,  
we might consider reframing legal issues—to see law as not only 
prohibitory, but also as pro-active, life-supporting and enhancing, 
and empowering. To think about what is ‘right’ and ‘good,’ and 
not just what is ‘wrong’ and punishable.51 
This contrast between Cover and Menkel-Meadow is no mere setting up 
of quarrelsome antagonists. Instead, it discloses two designs of a Law and 
Peace school of thought. One aim weighs Cover’s warning, which is also a 
demand that we live within truth: Cover calls upon us to discern how the 
law commits violence while it shams that it does otherwise. The other aim 
considers how the law can advance not just the absence of violence, but also 
                                                                                                                              
51 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward a Jurisprudence of Law, Peace, Justice, and a Tilt 
Toward Non-Violent and Empathetic Means of Human Problem Solving, 8 UNBOUND: 
HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 79, 102 (2012). 
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Menkel-Meadow’s enhancing life support, or what peace theorists have 
otherwise called “positive peace.”52 
At our symposium, the bulk of our attention shifted toward the first of 
these goals. Considering the definitions of violence set forth by Galtung and 
Farmer, we concentrated on whether the law creates a culture of violence 
that denies the structural violence it commits. Many panelists showed us 
how the law does succumb to such fictions and such sins. That is, the 
panelists showed us how the law in many cases pretends to persecute no 
one, and pretends to pretend nothing, even while it abuses its subjects and 
commits perjury about its own ends. 
II. WHAT WE LEARNED AT THE SYMPOSIUM 
Our first panel, on “Law, Peace, and Property,” featured scholars who 
struggle with law that appears to enhance the individual and the group: it 
claims to protect solitary rights through the “bundle of sticks” and bolster 
shared values through the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause, which 
permits the state to acquire land in the interest of the public good. Panelists 
on that morning slot taught us that while US property law may bestow 
certain gifts, its jurisprudence often grows from a cultural denial of 
connectivity—that is, connections between humans and the earth, humans 
and history, and human networks, and that these denials promote 
structurally violent severances. 
University of Michigan–Dearborn scholar Nehal Patel’s talk described 
this violent severance in environmental law. First, he detailed how humans’ 
effects on the environment ignored our relation to the earth. In response, he 
advocated a Gandhian environmental jurisprudence, which he described as 
                                                                                                                              
52 Galtung, supra note 48, at 183. See infra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
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an ecological trusteeship that recognizes the “world . . . as a family.”53 
Fordham professor Sonia Katyal also resisted law’s fractures. She recounted 
how property “outlaws,” such as homelessness and environmental activists, 
work to reconfigure property law’s culturally and structurally violent 
winner-take-all triumphalism by dilating its power to reach sociable 
loyalties that include care for low-income people.54 Following Sonia, 
Northwestern Law School’s David Dana and Nadav Shoked prompted us to 
think about community and individual property rights in the context of the 
Occupy Movement. In ways similar to Nehal and Sonia, David and Nadav 
impugned property law’s traditional exclusions and forceful ousters. They 
observed how Occupy Wall Street protesters blurred borders when setting 
up direct action camps outside of privately owned Wall Street banks. They 
advocated a First Amendment theory that allows a temporary right to rally 
in front of these establishments. This transient, legally privileged 
connection between Occupiers and elite real estate would stretch the 
boundaries of private property to challenge capitalism’s parceling of 
cultural and structural harms with protesters’ dreams of a better world. 
The naming of cultural and structural violence and denial also caused 
much thunder on the other panels. During the “War and Peace” panel, 
scholars lambasted a legal culture that brutally suppresses peace. Emory 
Law School’s Mary Dudziak wove a riveting tale of Ares and Cronos: she 
captured the myth of “wartime,” that story of peace’s supposed persistence 
and war’s rarity, which the state discharges to lull the rule of law during 
hostilities. But Mary has clocked US conflicts and found that the only real 
suspension is the citizenry’s disbelief, since US belligerence proves 
                                                                                                                              
53 Nehal A. Patel & Lauren Vella, A Mindful Environmental Jurisprudence?: 
Speculations on the Application of Gandhi’s Thought to MCWC v. Nestlé, 30 PACE 
ENVIRONMENTAL L. REV. 1116, 1140 (2013). 
54 See generally EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY 
OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF 
OWNERSHIP (2010). 
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constant. State power and voter credulity, then, form the real ignitions for 
“exceptional” detentions, waterboardings, and kill lists.55 Washington and 
Lee University Law School’s Mark Drumbl enlightened us about 
international law’s dangerous rhapsodies concerning child soldiers. Mark 
studies world treaties and instruments. Through this work, he discovered 
that international law treats children-at-arms as passive victims, in many 
cases absolving them of responsibility. This approach appears initially 
peaceable. But Mark explained how failure to behold the sometimes 
peripheral, sometimes extreme brutality committed by minors increases 
suffering of both these soldiers and their victims by preventing the soldiers 
from participating in truth and reconciliation processes as well as 
indigenous cleansing ceremonies.56 
Loyola Law School’s David Glazier increased our dread by flashing 
across the lecture hall’s overhead screen that morning’s headlines 
announcing the massing of Russian forces on Ukraine’s border.57 David 
then held forth on how the obstacles of state self-interest and hypocrisy 
have prevented the international community from prosecuting war crimes in 
the International Criminal Court until 2017.58 This lacuna may trammel 
deterrence, thus spurring more violence.59 Following David, St. Thomas 
University School of Law’s John Kang described how US laws punish 
violent masculinity in civil society but demand it in war. Through stories 
                                                                                                                              
55 See generally DUDZIAK, supra note 37 (performing a brilliant forensics of this 
practice). 
56 See generally MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLICY (2011). 
57 See Steven Lee Myers & Alison Smale, Russian Troops Mass at Border with Ukraine, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/europe/ukraine. 
html?_r=1. 
58 See generally Prof. David W. Glazier, Still a Bad Idea: Military Commissions Under 
the Obama Administration, 2010-32 Legal Studies Paper 2 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1658590; David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al 
Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957 (2009). 
59 Id. 
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about shark hunts, friendships, and foxhole terror, he made us understand 
how this clefted culture may exacerbate violence. John paid particular 
attention to the cases of soldier self-harming that multiply once the warriors 
return, baffled, to a seemingly meaningless “peacetime.”60 University of 
Pittsburgh Law School’s Bernard Hibbitts also named law’s cultural 
violence when he explained how lawyers pretend to be peacemakers but 
exist in a warrior tradition, which he proved by treating us to the obscure 
lawyering past of some of the United States’ most famous martial figures. 
When lawyers look away from this history, Bernard suggested, they might 
ignore how their own use of the law dangerously renews the ancient 
marriage between jurisprudence and the sword.61 
The scholars who assembled for the “Law, Peace, and Human Rights” 
panel brooded over how pro-rights regimes look and feel “right,”62 to use 
Galtung’s phrase, but actually spring from a hidden ancestry of inequality 
that haunts current reliefs. Loyola Law School’s Kathleen Kim dissected 
human trafficking statutes that criminalize this ghastly mercantilism. She 
showed us how such a punitive response does not spring from means-ends 
Benthamism63 or even glowering retributivism. Prurience, also, drives the 
enactments of these laws that silence and harm trafficking victims.64 
Northeastern Law’s Gabriel Arkles limned a similar double bind regarding 
                                                                                                                              
60 See generally John M. Kang, Manliness and the Constitution, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 261 (2009). 
61 See Bernard Hibbitts, Martial Lawyers, LEGAL HISTORY BLOG (Feb. 24, 2014, 7:00 
AM), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2014/02/martial-lawyers.html (this formed the 
basis for his talk and paper at the Law, Peace, and Violence Symposium). 
62 See Galtung, supra note 2. 
63 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Judge Posner’s Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 710, 715 n. 10 (1998) (“Bentham's distinctive ethics require normativity as the 
greatest good, impartiality through the pleasure principle with everyone counting for one, 
and good judgment by way of consequentialist or means-ends rationality.”) 
64 See generally Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 
409 (2011); Grace Chang & Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human 
Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
317 (2007). 
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criminal interdictions of prison rape, revealing how correctional anti-rape 
efforts often ignore sexual violence committed by guards and persecute 
consenting lovers.65 University of North Carolina School of Law’s Deborah 
Weissman built upon her scholarship that details how human rights 
traditions emerge from and replicate colonial histories, and also elaborated 
on her studies of feminist anti-domestic violence ambitions that ignore the 
role of poverty in intra-family violence.66 Deborah taught us that 
remembrance of the “will-to-power” must shape international human rights 
as well as domestic reform to repulse the hazards warned of by Cover.  
Following Deborah, University of Washington’s (English Department) 
Chandan Reddy reminded us that human rights only collect around those 
harms that mainstream society considers “grievable,” and that outcasts, such 
as gay teens, may well find themselves outside of that dominion of care.67 
University of California at Irvine’s Jane Stoever offered an important 
complement to these stories of a human rights system gone awry by 
recalling how her loving parents, both social justice activists, trained her in 
the high arts of the march and the chant. Jane’s account of her family’s 
commitment can inspire a human rights practice that remains conscious of 
the deadfalls of power plays and solipsism while working for the more 
peaceable world hinted at earlier by Nehal and Sonia on the Property 
panel.68 
                                                                                                                              
65 See generally Gabriel Arkles, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking 
Segregation of Transgender People in Detention, 18 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
515 (2009) (discussing violence and incarceration). 
66 See generally Weissman, supra note 36; Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights 
Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 
(2004). 
67 See, e.g., Chandan Reddy, Political Tears, 41 SW. L. REV. 275 (2012). 
68 See generally Jane Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. 
L.J. 483 (2013) (Stoever’s upbringing led her to concentrate her talents on eradicating 
domestic violence); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of 
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303 
(2011). 
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Our gathering on “Peacemaking, Resistance, and the Law” offered yet 
new insights and challenges. Scholars pursued a critique of nonviolence, 
which proves one of the hearts of the Law and Peace project. For though we 
may thrill at attempting to “live within” Havel’s “truth,” what exactly does 
that mean? A legal revolution based on such miasmal rights versus wrongs 
should be branded with large font warnings, for what may be your truth will 
not be mine, and vice versa. An ill-considered jurisprudence of nonviolence 
could effortlessly collapse back into the culture of violence. So of course we 
must look and listen and question and wonder and learn, which is what this 
panel—as all the others—helped us achieve. 
To this end, Seattle University Law’s own Dean Spade took up Cover’s 
gauntlet and gainsaid that US law could ever be used to further the aims of 
peace. In Dean’s assessment US jurisprudence proves wholly belligerent to 
peace because the United States is itself violence.69 Peace, if we are to find 
it, must arrive through means other than the law. Boalt’s Kathy Abrams 
described a different skepticism. While she did not despair of using the law 
to shore up peace, her studies of Arizona immigration activists did highlight 
protesters’ impatience with Gandhian and Kingian styles of resistance. 
Kathy gave accounts of activists initiating their direct action with a course 
of sit-ins and hunger strikes, but then shifting to “bolder” gestures including 
“taking over” buses and occupying buildings. Activists had grown tired of 
seeking social approval and began to risk a defiant atmosphere wherein they 
could muster personal power.70 Newcastle Law School’s Amy Maguire also 
                                                                                                                              
69 See generally DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL 
TRANS POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW (2011). 
70 See generally Murray, supra note 50, at 136; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 51. Kathy 
Abrams teaches about Arizona immigrant activism at Boalt Hall School of Law; her class 
is called Law and Social Change: The Movement for Immigrant Rights in Arizona: “The 
Immigrant Rights Movement in Arizona.” See 221.71 sec. 1—Law and Social Change: 
The Movement for Immigrant Rights in Arizona (Spring 2015), BERKELEY LAW, 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-
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reflected on flaws in nonviolent ideology in her talk about the Northern 
Ireland “peace process.” Amy taught us that while Northern Ireland’s 1998 
Good Friday Peace Agreement signaled a transition from violent conflict to 
political conflict, this apparently peaceable move has not resolved a meta-
conflict concerning self-determination. Amy counseled us how a just peace 
must be pursued, suggesting that some peace politics can run roughshod 
over equal dignity.71 
University of Arkansas Law School’s Uché Ewelukwa offered one of the 
more positive, if still subtle and contentious, defenses of nonviolent 
resistance in her description of nonviolent protesters who resist colonial 
depredations. Uché first taught us about the 1929 Igbo Women’s War, 
where Nigerian women agitated against Colonial rule by “sitting upon”—
that is, harassing—warrant chiefs who intended to tax the women in 
violation of Indigenous custom with the backing of British overseers.72 
Eventually, these tactics eased the way for some reforms by 1933.73 Uché 
compared the Women’s War to recent protests by Nigerian women against 
martial oil companies that shrug at Nigerians’ poverty. Uché recounted how 
these rebels used nudity as a powerful form of political shaming.74 Uché 
explained that these protests, while newsworthy, did not achieve the same 
gains as did the 1929 Women’s War. This is perhaps because of a failure by 
the protesters to win signed promise agreements from the companies to 
change their practices or provide reparations.75 
                                                                                                                              
programs/courses/coursePage.php?cID=15862&termCode=B&termYear=2015 (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
71 See generally Amy Maguire, Contemporary Anti-Colonial Self-Determination Claims 
and the Decolonisation of International Law, 22 GRIFFITH L. REV. 238 (2013). 
72 See, e.g., Judith Van Allen, Aba Riots or the Igbo Women’s War?—Ideology, 
Stratification and the Invisibility of Women, 6 UFAHAMU: J. AFR. STUD. 11, 13 (1975). 
73 Id. at 23. 
74 See generally Nigeria: Half-Nude Women Protest Against Shell in Bayelsa, 
ALLAFRICA (Jan. 8, 2014), http://allafrica.com/stories/201401080080.html. 
75 See generally Uché U. Ewelukwa, South-South Trade and Investment: The Good, the 
Bad and the Ugly—African Perspectives, 20 MINN. J. OF INT’L L. 513 (2011) (providing 
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III. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE 
The symposium in Seattle was a beginning, not an end. Our panelists 
surfaced at least three future charges in the work of understanding law’s 
possible connections to harmony. First, our discussion revealed that we 
understand far more about violence than we do about peace. We must build 
a larger vocabulary to describe both of these conditions so as to precisely 
name what we might deter and what we might assist. Second, the panelists 
disclosed that any efforts to remedy violence and create peace through law 
require a fitted and interrogative approach. That is, our methods must pay 
intense attention to the local culture that is being addressed, and must also 
prioritize critiques such as Dean’s and Amy’s, in order to avoid what Mary 
described during our proceedings as “peace essentialism.”76 Third, our 
conversations, to my surprise, revealed an unexpected truth: peace might 
come not only from saying yes, but also from admitting no. The panelists 
revealed how legal institutions so effectively destroy peace that legal actors 
must sometimes travel beyond their familiar wars and into a post-law 
territory to achieve real change. 
A. Language 
Our panelists began to map a language for how the law commits cultural 
and structural violence. Property law, we learned, spreads hurt when it 
denies human and historical connections. Human rights law distributes fear 
and pain when it succumbs to moral blindness and fails to account for 
poverty and power. The law of war multiplies death and anguish when it 
deals in fictions and blinkered self-interest. Even the goal of nonviolence 
                                                                                                                              
an analysis of African trade relations); Uché U. Ofodile, Trade, Empires, and Subjects: 
China-Africa Trade Relations—A New Fair Trade Arrangement or the Third Scramble 
for Africa? (Sep. 1, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2344323. 
76 Mary invented this phrase at our symposium. Her phrasing found inspiration in the 
work of Angela Harris, see infra note 78. 
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can harm instead of help when it imposes a mandate of passivity, muffles 
expressions of agony and anger, and vetoes self-defense. 
These forms of violence lurk within the kingdoms of cultural and 
structural violence, and belong to law. They deserve to be named and sifted. 
They are the cultural violence of denial, solipsism, and prurience. They are 
the structural violence of exclusion, forced masculinity, and forced 
victimhood. Upon absorbing Mary’s critique of peace essentialism, we also 
learned about the cultural violence of monolithic approaches to 
nonviolence.77 
But what about peace? At the symposium we admitted that we 
understood much less about this benefaction. Also, our vocabulary proved 
impoverished when trying to describe its lineaments. As I have just 
mentioned, Mary ushered in this anxiety when she questioned whether we 
risked falling prey to an incurious peace essentialism.78 In other words, did 
we hazard a grand—and far too simple—theory of legal peace? Galtung 
observed the potential ambuscades of peace rhetoric even as he helped birth 
peace theory:  
Few words are so often used and abused [as peace] . . . when 
efforts are made to plead almost any kind of policy . . . it is often 
asserted that [a favored policy] . . . will also serve the cause of 
peace . . . regardless of how tenuous the relation has been in the 
past or how dubious the theory.79  
                                                                                                                              
77 Id. 
78 See id. See also Angela P. Harris, Race Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (introducing a concept of essentialism into legal discourse 
and asking how feminist legal theory reduced women into an “essence” and presenting 
the notion that a “unitary, ‘essential’ women’s experience can be isolated and described 
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience”). Peace 
essentialism, then, would be a reductive, even stereotypical, definition of peace that 
ignores how peace interacts with race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, and other 
manifold identities and experiences. 
79 Galtung, supra note 48, at 167. 
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This dilemma of oversimplifying legal “peace” redoubles when we ponder 
whether peace exists only in the absence of violence or promises something 
more. Is the first definition a cop-out? Is the second answer utopian? 
Galtung again offers aid here, as he coined the concepts of negative peace 
and positive peace.80 Negative peace exists in the “the absence of personal 
violence,” and positive peace consists of “social justice.”81 These 
definitions are helpful, but incomplete. At the symposium, several moments 
passed when we felt this landmark challenge of defining legal peace as a 
community.  
Mary brought us to this important crossroads. While lecturing on war and 
time, she projected a recently-snapped photo of the Mall of America, that 
symbol of US plenty. She queried whether this image of a shopping 
coliseum relayed “peace” as it certainly seemed to, being that the Mall is a 
pleasure garden. “But is this American peace?” she asked us. Since the 
United States waged war in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time that the picture 
was taken, then the seeming tranquility of the Mall began to appear, under 
Mary’s prodding, as yet another site of cultural violence. The amusements 
of the Mall pacify the people who might otherwise object to war if made to 
wrangle with its rigors and discomforts.  
Mary’s questions illuminate that tranquility that promotes violence is not 
peace. Or, in the spirit of avoiding peace and violence essentialism, perhaps 
the better account is that tranquility that promotes violence can only 
constitute a partial or qualified peace. Even the most benign forms of amity 
or joy (such as the bemusement of consumers or the rapture found at rallies) 
that flourish during wartime could be said to foster war’s violence. 
A similar disenchantment flowered during Uché’s talk when she 
projected a photograph of armed soldiers guarding Nigeria’s corporate oil 
fields. She next displayed images of local poverty, revealing people 
                                                                                                                              
80 Id. at 183. 
81 Id. at 183, 190 (emphasis omitted). 
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standing around polluted areas or perhaps even scavenging. “Is this peace?” 
she asked us, shaking her head. “I don’t know.” And neither did we—but 
we began to suspect that if it were, it was not anything that we wanted to 
promote. Moreover, while the absence of war could clarify a legal definition 
of peace, at least in the negative sense, the omnipresent threat of violence 
urged an opposite conclusion. Uché showed us that quiescence in the 
shadow of force is not peace. Or, again, such dead calm may be at best a 
partial or qualified peace.  
Uché’s and Mary’s descriptions of these admixed realities recall my 
earlier mention of the nabobs of Studio City, who levitate above the 
homeless people collected at their literal feet. These are violent peaces. 
They are darknesses visible. But to upend the balance, and admit more light 
than shadow, requires that we first see and describe the paradox. 
What I suspect then is that peace will almost always prove to be an 
incomplete state, particularly when we gauge it in relation to the state’s 
behavior. Perfect peace probably does not exist except in very brief 
moments, and on a personal level. In a private conversation that I shared 
with Deborah, we considered the elusive character of peace, and agreed that 
it is usually experienced in lucky, fugitive hours shared with family and 
friends. Instead of quixotically searching for a legal means for guaranteeing 
these fragments of bliss, our panelists suggested how the law could moot 
skills and attitudes needed to chart a world where negative peace prevailed 
and human flourishing could exist. That is, they gave voice to legal values 
that might create the possibilities of a more coherent peace. 
Sonia, Nehal, and Jane all sketched the promises of peace in the values of 
community, of Gandhi’s satyagraha, and in the loving bonds of kindred. 
Peace, like violence, they taught us, is created by and through relationships. 
And Dean, during the question-and-answer phase of the Resistance panel, 
offered the following related definition of peace, “Peace” he said, “is when 
people have what they need.” Together these scholars help us discern that 
love, happiness, sharing and giving, and care might bend the law—or, as 
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Dean urged, some other system—toward the many varieties of peace. 
Scholars have already articulated such aspirations in human rights, queer 
legal theory, mindfulness, and feminist legal theory.82 Human rights 
theorists, queer legal theorists, critical race theorists, and feminist legal 
theorists have also commenced developing vernaculars that might express 
                                                                                                                              
82 See Henry J. Richardson, III, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as an International Human 
Rights Leader, 52 VILL. L. REV. 471, 476 (2007) (“King projected an approach to 
international relations, new to the twentieth century, based [in part on] love. Even love of 
opponents and enemies.”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xvii (1st ed., 2010) (advocating a 
launching ground for law and policy that eliminates the politics of disgust and replaces it 
with a politics of humanity that fosters sympathy, imagination, and respect, as well as 
“something else, something closer to love.”); Angela P. Harris, Toward Lawyering as 
Peacemaking: A Seminar on Mindfulness, Morality, and Professional Identity, 61 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 647, 648 (2012) (describing teaching a seminar on peacemaking, law, and 
mindfulness, which involved “the cultivation of love and compassion for ourselves and 
others and discourage[ing] the cultivation of anger, hatred, jealousy, resentment, envy 
and other ‘negative’ emotions.”); Cf. Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s 
Violence: The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL 
LEFT 109, 121 (2013) (making a space for nonviolent change within criminal law and 
policy by incorporating “unfinished alternatives” within such systems; “unfinished 
alternatives” are open ended, and resemble certain key emotional states, such as love, 
which is “boundless” and “uncertain”); GENE SHARP, THE POLITICS OF NONVIOLENT 
ACTION: PART ONE POWER AND STRUGGLE vi (1973) (“exhortations in favor of love and 
nonviolence have made little or no contribution to ending war and major political 
violence.”); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 143 (1999) (advocating not for 
cultivating love within the law or policy but still seeking to nourish peaceful values 
within law and society and calling for a state of law that would help create some of the 
preconditions necessary for the development of loving bonds). Professor West explains 
that “[t]he state needs to be more, not less, involved in the work of supporting families so 
as to ensure the presence, in every family, of parents who have the time required to 
provide not just physical necessities but love, play, companionship, and fun for their 
children.” Id.; Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 165, 195 (1998) (“[W]e need to increase the odds of women being able to 
develop as sexual subjects should they so choose.”); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing 
Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183 (2001) 
(“Can law protect pleasure? Should it?”); JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: 
RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 77 (2009) (arguing that the aim of life is love and 
justice); Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 101 (2008) 
(encouraging intimacy in family by arguing that family law should observe a Reparative 
Model). 
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human problems unrecognized in legal discourse.83 If a jurisprudence of 
nonviolence requires a midwifery of new language, this young discipline 
must join hands with these other schools of thought. So perhaps it is no 
accident that Sonia, Nehal, Jane, and Dean arrived to the symposium as 
formidable critics of race, gender, class, and sexuality oppression. Their 
expertise helped them identify love, care, sociability, family, satyagraha, 
and even skepticism as briefs we might depend on when suing for a more 
complete peace through law. 
B.  Questioning Law, Peace, and Violence 
The call for a greater lexicon that describes violence and peace raises an 
opportunity: as we search for manifold descriptions of these conditions, 
some of our definitions will clash and require rethought. This is as it should 
be, for the writers and practitioners of peace jurisprudences must interrogate 
themselves as well as this new discipline. Mary’s warning about peace 
essentialism, as well as Dean’s, Uché’s, and Kathy’s questions about 
nonviolence activism, encouraged careful deliberations of whether a 
behavior is violent or peaceful. I surmise that peace and violence exist on a 
continuum, much as scholars and other writers have discovered how gender, 
                                                                                                                              
83 See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and 
Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
CUTTING EDGE 326 (1995) (quoting Audre Lorde, The Transformation of Silence into 
Language and Action, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 44 (1984)) (the 
proposition that “there needs to be an end to the silence around . . . the interactions of 
race, class, gender, and sexuality, and the ‘transformation of silence into language and 
action.’”); Harris, supra note 78, at 616 (naming race essentialism); Francisco Valdes, 
Afterward and Prologue: Queer Legal Theory, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 344, 346 (1995) (taking 
as a project of Queer Legal Theory “Finding, Naming, & Situating the Missing Voice”); 
Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes, in AT THE 
BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY: VOL. 1 57, 58 (Martha Fineman 
ed., 2012) (citing Mary Daly and Audre Lorde in her invocation of a feminist and anti-
poverty “emancipatory language practice”). 
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race, illness, and disability endure in multiple dimensions.84 Again, we are 
made to look to critical race, queer, and feminist legal theory for searching 
and alloyed models. 
But grand theories of peace do exist. We must grasp the challenges of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Gene Sharp, and more pressingly, Mohandas 
Gandhi, who in the latter case advanced a nearly absolute pacifism.85 Are 
we legal pacifists? No one at the symposium, as far as I could tell, 
advocated such a winnowed legal approach to problems of violence. I have 
already written of the hazards of such supposed purism,86 and the papers at 
the symposium reinforced this conclusion.87 As a consequence, there will be 
times when law and peace advocates contest over the proper use of force 
used in self-defense, punishment, and war.  
These conflicts give rise to a legal method. First, we can study whether 
an individual or state action is violent, that is, whether peace has been 
abridged. This pursuit requires readings of the manifold, inessential 
definitions of violence and peace. Second, we can inquire whether more 
peaceful legal solutions may be found, which (at least for me) is the main 
priority of a peaceful jurisprudence. If not, then we must entertain whether 
                                                                                                                              
84 See, e.g., Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social 
and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 275 (2005) (describing a “gender galaxy.”); Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories: In and Out, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 1200 (2004) 
(“Today, many Critical Race Theorists have recognized multidimensionality as a natural 
progression of intersectionality.”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON 
DISABILITY 21 (2011), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/97892 
40685215_eng.pdf (defining a disability as a “complex multidimensional experience 
[that] poses several challenges for measurement. Approaches to measuring disability vary 
across countries and influence the results.”). 
85 See Murray, supra note 50, at 70 (noting Gandhi’s approach to nonviolence and his 
allowance of some exceptions for the rule of “soul” not “body” force). 
86 Id. at 136. 
87 See supra Part II (detailing the theses of the panelists. Their critiques of the way the 
law fosters violence and critiques of the nonviolence project led in directions opposite to 
a legal pacifism). 
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the problems at stake require a forceful, violent, or bold response—
whatever we determine these concepts mean. In all of these analyses, we 
must challenge our own definitions and assumptions, and recognize the 
varied workings of power as well as the vicissitudes of that sometimes brute 
thing, language.88 
The panelists brought to light another imperative, which is how attention 
to the local culture being addressed will help us grasp the colliding 
meanings of violence and peace. Just as we must avoid peace essentialism, 
develop our lexicon, and question ourselves, we should also reflect on how 
peace and violence’s designations will depend on geography, culture, 
government, and economics.  
Uché’s talk helped us understand the importance of context. Negative 
peace may constitute some kind of authentic or “good enough” peace in 
certain situations—say, when attempting to curb sexual violence in the 
United States, a goal so fraught that adding the demands of positive peace 
could be too cumbersome for the immediate present. However, negative 
peace might mean too little in the Nigeria Uché taught us about, where there 
is an absence of official armed conflict but guns everywhere, as well as 
poverty, and want, and pain.  
David’s and Nadav’s talks also emphasized the importance of local 
culture and industry:  They called for increased First Amendment freedoms 
                                                                                                                              
88 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 78, at 602–03 (analyzing and critiquing race essentialism); 
see generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) 
(analyzing abuses of power that exist in anti-racist and feminist politics); JANET HALLEY, 
SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 330 (2006) 
(critiquing feminism for ignoring the harms suffered by men); Hutchinson, supra note 83, 
at 602 (advocating an open and interrogative jurisprudential method that may help 
recognize how race, class, gender, sexual orientation and other factors influence life 
under the law); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing 
the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law 
and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (advocating a multivocal narrative 
jurisprudential method). 
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specifically for Occupy protests that occurred on Wall Street. While 
property owners might sense a violent penetration of their rights—and they 
could be correct in that—site-specific analysis may make us discern also 
that their exclusion of protesters on Wall Street crushes peace-seeking 
dissent. After all, an anti-Wall Street protest that is forced into Brooklyn 
loses a great deal of its meaning and impact. 
The two Kathleens—Kathy Abrams and Kathleen Kim—offered their 
own takes on locality. Kathy’s description of the specific cultural politics 
that now threaten Arizona’s Latinos explained why immigrant activists’ 
direct action pivoted from classical nonviolence to “boldness,” which 
blurred the line between violence and nonviolence. And Kathleen observed 
victims’ own lives to establish a legal response to human trafficking. She 
noted that lobbyists’ tone-deafness and concupiscence can obscure victims’ 
stories, and so create violence in the name of peace.  
In all of these ways the panelists taught us that the local—meaning 
everything from the specific site of violence to the particular culture and 
worldview of perpetrators and victims—will matter in a searching, subtle, 
sometimes antipodal, and always ambitious peacemaking jurisprudence. 
C. Robert Cover Was Right 
We found possibilities of peace in Seattle. But we also rediscovered that 
Robert Cover was onto something, and learned, too, that Dean knows what 
he is talking about. Nearly all the scholars at the symposium limned law’s 
brutality. Let us live in truth, then: law is expert at killing peace. Not for 
nothing, after all, did Max Weber define the state as a monopoly on 
legitimate violence.89 
                                                                                                                              
89 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES: “SCIENCE AS A 
VOCATION” “POLITICS AS A VOCATION” 33 (2004) (“the state is the form of human 
community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical 
violence.”). 
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This means that peacemaking lawyers might consider sometimes moving 
out of the house that the master’s tools built. If Janet Halley is rash enough 
to suggest that we take a break from feminism,90 we could take a break from 
law. We can do this not only in theory, but also in practice. 
I have tried this myself, and found it a bracing exercise in losing status. I 
return again to my homeland, the storied village of Studio City. I have lived 
there for 19 years, and spent most of these past decades holed up in my 
bedroom furiously typing away about violence and poverty in East Los 
Angeles, Detroit, New York, Europe, and the Americas—in short, 
anywhere but the place that I supposedly know best. It wasn’t until a friend 
of mine pointed out the homelessness problem in my own backyard that I 
realized that I could just work here for the rest of my life and still not 
resolve local cruelty. This realization also opened my eyes to the way law 
and culture worked together to make the nightmare of Studio City violence 
look and feel right, and how I had to move outside of my comfort zone to 
try to change that. 
Shortly after my friend shook me awake, I began to work in the North 
Hollywood Interfaith Food Pantry, an interdenominational organization that 
runs out of a local church and is staffed by Jewish and Christian—and, in 
my case, befuddledly agnostic-verging-on-hardcore-atheist—volunteers. I 
worked on Fridays under the guidance of Beth Greenburg, one of the 
Pantry’s supervisors. People from the community show up at First Christian 
Church of North Hollywood, sign up on a sheet, and then stand in line for a 
sack of groceries. Some groceries are bagged for families, whom I observed 
to be largely of color. Others are wrapped up for homeless people, who are 
mostly Anglo. For the weeks that I worked at the Pantry, I helped load 
foodstuffs for homeless people, which meant wrapping dinged up, bakery-
donated sweets for shy, silent folks with substance abuse problems. I did 
                                                                                                                              
90 See generally HALLEY, supra note 88. 
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this under the direction of Beth, a silver-haired saint with a gift for 
efficiency and warmth and giving hugs.  
My service at the Pantry taught me that law didn’t do much good for the 
homeless people of Studio City. Law professors didn’t either, at least I 
didn’t, since I kept wrapping up the wrong items and getting in the way. 
Eventually Beth assigned me to care for another volunteer, whom I will call 
Sandy. Sandy had early onset Alzheimer’s and, like me, created more 
mischief than added value. Sandy and I milled around the Pantry and 
chatted about the weather until I eventually stopped showing up. 
I learned a lot about the limits of law and myself at the Pantry. I realized 
that the law has a lot less power than I gave it credit for. As I wrapped up 
pastries, monitored Sandy, and helped folks with sign-up sheets, 
jurisprudence’s influence mostly made itself felt in its revealed myth-
making that the United States is a peaceful and fair nation, a tale belied by 
the suffering of people waiting in line for food. I also learned that 
lawyers—or at least I—have few skills to help others outside of their 
mastery of the written word. In the end, I created less peace than I observed 
its manufacture through Beth, who has no legal training but has devoted 
herself to the alleviation of local anguish for decades. I saw her develop 
both negative peace—in the assuaging of pain, that is, hunger—as well as 
her cultivation of positive peace, through smiles and well-wishes and the 
aforementioned hugs. She even performed peace on my own person by 
making me feel like a valuable member of the team even though I 
contributed less than Sisyphus. 
I am hopeful. I am ambitious. But my time at the Pantry and at the 
symposium taught me this: if other lawyers and legal scholars angling for 
peace want to live in truth, then challenges like Wallace Stevens’s and 
Vaclav Havel’s are going to take us in several different directions. I cannot 
escape the fact that it is probably a good idea for us to absorb the final “no” 
that I now understand has been here all along. That is, we must confront 
how legal institutions help create a society where consistent, whole peace 
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seems impossible—even in the midst of affluence and presumably free 
election. Indeed, the lessons I’ve learned from Cover, my fellow panelists, 
and my “break from law” at the Pantry have led to a realization that peace 
development requires even more than a jurisprudential rest, à la Halley.91 
The problems of poverty, punishment, jealous property rights, war, 
ecological despair, and human trafficking are, right now, insoluble. And 
why wouldn’t they be? So much of legal code assumes that we are 
engineered for hoarding and for hate, and offers no other manner of living. 
My condemnation need not lead to apathy, for at the symposium we 
discovered many ways to reshape the law from a blunt force weapon into a 
force of creation. But it is also time to think in different terms. 
To preserve life, and to relieve suffering, legal scholars should begin to 
consider non-law as a fertile field for change. Restorative justice and 
negotiation resolve problems by looking to native and historical customs, 
expressions of emotions, and communication styles rather than to 
“retributivist and vengeance-seeking forms of justice.”92 As such, they offer 
two iconic offspring of law.93 Interdisciplinary legal study also 
                                                                                                                              
91 See id. 
92 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 10.1 (2007). See also Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 570 (2006) 
(“Inspired by concerns about efficiency, access, and justice, ADR advocates urged that 
disputes be resolved, not only in public trials, but also through negotiation, mediation, 
and arbitration.”). 
93 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 92, at 10.6 (“Modern restorative justice traces 
its origins to objections to both retributivist and failed rehabilitative models of criminal 
law and punishment.”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is the Adversary System Really Dead? 
Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve, CURRENT LEGAL 
PROB. 84, 101 (Jane Holder, Colm O’Cinneide, & Michael Freeman eds., 2004) (“[The] 
various forms of modern dispute resolution suggest we have evolved into something 
different in this new process pluralism that we are increasingly using, or we are, at least, 
reinventing or redesigning the myriad ways our early predecessors chose different 
processes for different purposes.”). See also Laurie S. Kohn, What’s so Funny About 
Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice as a New Paradigm for Domestic 
Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 530 (2010) (“Restorative justice, 
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acknowledges the limits of jurisprudence, and seeks to expand legal thought 
to include insights gleaned from psychology, sociology, mindfulness, 
economics, and literature, among other fields.94 These innovations can 
inspire us to go even further. Beyond interdisciplinary practice exists the 
permission for legal actors and scholars to search for redresses to war, 
poverty, and discrimination wholly outside of law’s models. This project 
involves more than conflict resolution; we must invent other ways of being 
that might be liberated from the law’s field of blood and death. 
I am talking about accompaniments, encores, accessories, and 
alternatives to law. I am, more specifically, beginning to imagine post-law. I 
admit the very concept of post-law could be terrifying, since the opposite of 
law is lawlessness. But within the gap between judging and anarchy lies 
uncharted space for the “yes.” As legal scholars, we know the designs of 
jurisprudence and its deadly habits. Such knowledge may carry us into a 
new era whose citizens do not consider peace a dream or a nullity, and work 
toward it as a form of justice. My fantasy future will inevitably have its own 
problems and its own traumas. Still, peace and its bold inventions remain 
goals worth pursuing nevertheless. 
CONCLUSION  
But let us return to the remaining possibilities of achieving peace through 
law. Robert Cover’s 1986 essay, morose and brilliant, has long waited to 
burst forth into a new way of thinking about the legal institutions. We have 
begun to do so. Like other scholars heedful to the pain and hypocrisies that 
                                                                                                                              
which has long been a justice system norm in indigenous populations and has 
increasingly appeared in juvenile justice interventions since the 1970s, focuses on 
addressing harms caused by socially unacceptable or criminal behaviors by engaging the 
community, victims, and offenders themselves.”). 
94 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Symposium, Taking Law and _____ Really 
Seriously: Before, During, and After “The Law”, 60 VAND. L. REV. 555 (2007) (One of 
the best meditations on the values of interdisciplinary study in law and legal education 
can be found in  this article of Carrie Menkel-Meadow’s). 
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pass as the way things “have to be,” we perceive that the law performs 
violence. We discern that the law is violence. We see that it causes the 
people to suffer, and does little to prevent their afflictions. The question is, 
what to do with this knowledge? 
Even as I continue to wonder at my fecklessness at the Pantry, and try to 
see past the law’s long reach, I still join in Carrie Menkel-Meadow’s 
aspirations to grow a greater, if incremental, peace from the legal code’s 
rocky soil. The work will be hard, but we are not alone in hewing a new 
way. Legal scholars naming race, class, disability, sexuality, and class 
oppression have already done so. And just as Havel observed that the cozy 
nihilist inside us always jockeys with the committed idealist, we may think 
back on the all ways in history that people have tried to do better.  
At our symposium we participated in this effort.  Our struggles make me 
remember the work of the economist Albert Hirschman. Around the same 
time that Havel wrote his deathless treatise on dissent, Hirschman also 
wrote of the trials of transformation. He noted that folks working within 
failing institutions usually take one of three options—dissenters exit, 
exercise their voice, or stay steadfast in loyalty.95 In our work at the 
symposium, we wielded all three of these gestures. We exited as much as 
possible legal constructs that do harm, gave voice to the harm that they do, 
and in this fashion, also expressed a loyalty to the rule of law that we hope 
can help the people. In other words, we helped map the DNA of a nascent 
Law and Peace school of thought. We also edged just a little closer to a 
legal world that ceases to pretend and lives more in an important, if still 
contested, truth. 
                                                                                                                              
95 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSE TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
